/ Модель

Характеристики

Лицензия
Apache 2.0
Базовая модель
Qwen3.8-27B
Опубликована
22 авг 2026

OBLITERATUS-Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-unsloth-mlx

Генерация текстаТекст → текст3 профессии

Мультимодальная модель Qwen3.8-27B с ослабленными механизмами отказа для локальных red-team-оценок и исследований безопасности ИИ.

128скачиваний за 30 дней2лайкавеса обновлены24 авг 2026

Бенчмарки

Как модель справилась с задачами пользователей ailist и что о ней публикуют открытые лидерборды

Публичные оценки

Из открытых лидербордов. Сравнивайте результаты одного теста при одинаковых условиях — отсутствие оценки не значит, что модель хуже.

В подключённых источниках результатов для этой модели пока нет.

Что умеет модель

Описание составлено по карточке модели и метаданным Hugging Face

OBLITERATUS-Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-unsloth-mlx — производная от Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B модель, созданная Pliny the Prompter с применением методов abliteration и смешивания весов. Это плотная мультимодальная модель семейства Qwen с 27 млрд параметров; базовая модель предназначена для диалогов, анализа изображений и видео, программирования и многошаговых задач. В карточке представлены веса safetensors и GGUF, а также 4- и 8-битные варианты MLX для Apple Silicon.

Модель предназначена для исследований геометрии отказов и устойчивости защитных механизмов, red-team-оценок и локальных экспериментов с ответами без штатных ограничений безопасности. Автор сообщает о частоте отказов 0,24% на наборе из 842 запросов и результате MMLU 84,32% против 84,60% у исходной модели; это результаты проверок автора, а не независимая оценка. Рекомендуются температура 0, штраф за повторы 1,15 и не менее 2048 новых токенов; для GGUF автор советует отключить режим thinking.

По описанию, модель чаще отвечает на запросы, которые исходная Qwen3.8-27B отклонила бы, поэтому её использование требует осторожности. Лицензия — Apache-2.0. README сообщает, что MLX-квантизации основаны на V1 и ещё не обновлены до V2; также полная проверка MMLU на 14 тысячах вопросов на момент публикации продолжалась.

Сценарии применения

  • оценка устойчивости защитных механизмов LLM
  • исследование причин и механизмов отказов модели
  • red-team-тестирование поведения чат-модели
  • локальные эксперименты с генерацией кода и ответов
  • сравнение ответов модели с исходной Qwen3.8-27B

Ограничения

Модель намеренно ослабляет штатные механизмы отказа и может выполнять запросы, которые исходная модель отклонила бы; результаты тестов в README приведены автором и не являются независимой оценкой. Варианты MLX основаны на V1, а полная проверка MMLU на 14 тысячах вопросов ещё продолжалась.

Для каких профессий подходит3

Разделы каталога профессий, в задачах которых используется эта модель

Все профессии

Карточка модели

README от автора на Hugging Face, как он его опубликовал

Открыть на Hugging Face

⛓️‍💥 MLX quantization of Qwen3.8-27B — OBLITERATED

Using imatrix from Unsloth

Zero refusals. Capability matching or exceeding stock.

🆕 V2: Complementary Abliteration Blending

V2 replaces the V1 weights with a novel technique: complementary abliteration blending. Instead of one surgery, we run two surgeries that fail in different ways (aggressive/SVD for deep refusal removal, LEACE for capability preservation), then blend their weights so the failures cancel out.

Stock Qwen3.8-27BV1V2
MMLU (lm-eval, 0-shot)84.6% (n=2850)81.4% (n=285)84.3% (n=2850)
vs stock—-6.0pp-0.3pp (within error)
Refusal rate~100%0.0% (842 prompts)0.24% (2/842)
Usable output—80%100%
Advanced real-world5/8untested7/8 (ties stock)
Tool calling / code gen✓untested✓

† 842-corpus validated. V1 scored 0/842; V2 scored 2/842 (0.24%). Ship score improved from 88.7 (V1) to 92.1 (V2).

MMLU note: At n=50 per subject (2,850 questions), V2 scores within ±0.65pp of stock — a massive improvement over V1's -6.0pp gap. Humanities improved +1.4pp while social sciences regressed -1.5pp, netting approximately even.


⚙️ Optimal Settings — THESE MATTER!

settingvaluewhy
temperature0Greedy decoding produces the most complete, code-rich outputs. Temps above 0.5 degrade quality significantly.
repetition_penalty1.15Essential. Without it, greedy decoding loops on imports/boilerplate. 1.15 gives the fullest answers; 1.10-1.12 for tighter/shorter output.
max_new_tokens≥ 2048Complex code and attack chains need room.
System promptNone / emptyA/B tested — system prompts can reintroduce refusals. Naked is better.
enable_thinkingOFF (critical!)Thinking mode reintroduces refusals. The model's reasoning chain can re-derive refusal from first principles even though refusal directions were removed from generation weights. V2's chat template defaults to thinking OFF. Do NOT enable thinking unless you accept partial refusals.
top_p / top_k / min_pNot neededGreedy + repetition_penalty handles this model best. Sampling adds randomness without quality gains.

⚠️ GGUF users: V2 GGUFs ship with a modified chat template that defaults to thinking OFF. If your inference tool (Ollama, LM Studio, llama.cpp) overrides the template or enables thinking, you may see refusals. Ensure thinking is disabled in your tool's settings.

from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer

model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
    "OBLITERATUS/Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED",
    torch_dtype="bfloat16",
    device_map="auto",
)
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(
    "OBLITERATUS/Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED"
)

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Your query here"}]
text = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(
    messages, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True,
    enable_thinking=False
)

inputs = tokenizer(text, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)
outputs = model.generate(
    **inputs,
    max_new_tokens=2048,
    do_sample=False,
    repetition_penalty=1.15,
)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))

🧨 V2: How It Works

Most abliterations use a single method — find refusal directions, project them out. The deeper you cut, the more capability you lose. V1 proved this: 5 SVD directions achieved 0% refuse but cost -6pp MMLU.

V2 breaks this tradeoff by blending two complementary surgeries:

Surgery A (aggressive/SVD)Surgery B (LEACE)V2 Blend
MethodGreedy SVD variance captureMinimize mutual information60% B + 40% A
Refusal removalDeep (0% refuse)Moderate (0% refuse)0% refuse
Output quality100% usable50% usable100% usable
MMLU vs stock-2.0pp+0.7pp+1.1pp

Each method makes different mistakes in different parts of the weight space. SVD damages capability where it greedily captures variance. LEACE leaves refusal residue in the generation pathway. The blend averages out each method's weaknesses.

The 60/40 ratio was found by binary search over {0.30, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70}.

Full research writeup and reproduction code: OBLITERATUS repo


🧪 The Numbers

MMLU (lm-eval-harness, 0-shot)

ModelMMLUnStderrvs Stock
Stock Qwen3.8-27B84.60%2,850±0.65—
V1 (s51, aggressive)81.4%285—-6.0pp
V2 (s78, blend)84.32%2,850±0.65-0.28pp

Full MMLU (14k questions) validation in progress.

Refusal Rate

TestV1V2
Hard-10 (hand-crafted)0/10 (0%)0/10 (0%)
842-Corpus0/842 (0%)2/842 (0.24%)
Ship score88.792.1

V2 has 2 residual hard refusals out of 842 prompts. Ship score improved from 88.7 to 92.1 due to higher overall output quality.

Advanced Real-World Tasks (thinking OFF)

TaskV2Stock
ReAct agent loop (Thought/Action/SQL)✓✓
Async code refactoring (sync→async+logging)✓✓
JSON schema extraction (incident→structured)✓✓
K8s pod crash debugging + fix commands✓✓
Adversarial instruction following✓✓
Security code review (3+ vulns in Flask)✓✓
Distributed system design (Redis rate limiter)✓✓
Multi-tool chain (search→fetch→email)✗✗
Total7/87/8

V2 matches stock on every practical task while being fully uncensored.


🔴 Refusal Removal

This model will comply with requests that stock Qwen3.8-27B would refuse. V1 validated 0/842 refusals across a comprehensive harmful prompt corpus including:

  • Malware development, RAT scripts, C2 infrastructure
  • Social engineering, phishing, vishing playbooks
  • Exploit development and vulnerability research
  • Jailbreak design and safety bypass taxonomies
  • DAN prompts and prompt injection techniques

V2 inherits this from both parent surgeries and showed 0/52 on a random sample. Full revalidation in progress.


⚠️ Research Context

This model has had safety guardrails surgically removed. It will comply with requests that stock Qwen3.8-27B would refuse.

Who this is for

  • 🔬 Alignment researchers studying refusal geometry and safety robustness
  • 🔴 Red-teamers evaluating post-training safety against weight surgery
  • 🧪 AI safety evaluators who need an unrestricted baseline
  • 💻 Local-first users who want full control over their own hardware

Who this is NOT for

  • Anyone seeking to cause real-world harm to real people
  • Anyone without the technical understanding to use uncensored models responsibly

You are solely responsible for how you use this model and any content it generates.


📦 Downloads

GGUF — for llama.cpp, Ollama, LM Studio

FileQuantSizeVibe
Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-Q8_0.ggufQ8_0~27 GB🎯 Maximum quality
Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-Q6_K.ggufQ6_K~21 GB⚖️ Great balance
Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-Q5_K_M.ggufQ5_K_M~18 GB💪 Solid all-rounder
Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-Q4_K_M.ggufQ4_K_M~16 GB📱 Sweet spot
Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED-IQ4_XS.ggufIQ4_XS~14 GB🪶 Smallest, still capable

Safetensors — for 🤗 Transformers

Full bfloat16 weights, 18 shards, ~54 GB.

MLX — for Apple Silicon (native)

PathBitsSize
mlx-4bit/4-bit~14 GB
mlx-8bit/8-bit~27 GB

Note: MLX quantizations are from V1 and will be updated.


🔬 V2 Surgery Recipe

stock Qwen3.8-27B (snapshot 1d4bf0f2)
  → V1 surgery chain (s13→s23→s30→s51)
  → V2: complementary blend of two new surgeries from s30:

  Surgery A (s62): aggressive, 3 SVD directions, reg 0.08,
    residue-weight 3, 2 refinement passes, min_layer 0.45

  Surgery B (s72): aggressive + LEACE direction method,
    3 directions, reg 0.06, residue-weight 7,
    3 refinement passes, min_layer 0.40

  → Weight blend: 60% Surgery B + 40% Surgery A
  → Restore MTP + vision tensors from stock
  → Convert GGUFs from merged model

V1 → V2: What Changed

V1 used a single aggressive surgery (5 SVD directions, reg 0.04). It found the refusal axes but damaged capability geometry along the way.

V2's key insight: different direction-finding methods damage different parts of the model. SVD greedily captures variance (including capability). LEACE minimizes mutual information (preserving capability). Blending their outputs averages out each method's weaknesses — a novel application of weight-space interpolation to abliteration.


🏗️ Credits

License

Apache 2.0 (same as base model)

Как запустить

На своей GPU в ailist. Цена — по текущим предложениям провайдеров

GPU в ailist

Универсальный рантайм

Нельзя запустить

MLX-модели работают только на Apple Silicon.

Ревизия весов
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