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Характеристики

Лицензия
MIT
Базовая модель
DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731
Библиотека
transformers
Опубликована
13 авг 2026

DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731-Abliterated

Генерация текстаТекст → текст3 профессии

Производная от DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 языковая модель для генерации текста и диалогов с удалённым поведением отказа.

107скачиваний за 30 дней3лайкавеса обновлены16 авг 2026

Бенчмарки

Как модель справилась с задачами пользователей ailist и что о ней публикуют открытые лидерборды

Публичные оценки

Из открытых лидербордов. Сравнивайте результаты одного теста при одинаковых условиях — отсутствие оценки не значит, что модель хуже.

В подключённых источниках результатов для этой модели пока нет.

Что умеет модель

Описание составлено по карточке модели и метаданным Hugging Face

DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731-Abliterated — производная модель на основе DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731, созданная автором репозитория windowsxp811203. Это вариант с удалённым поведением отказа: веса проекций выходов внимания изменены закрытой формулой без обучения, а эксперты, нормализации и эмбеддинги сохранены. По заявлению автора, модель сохраняет близкие к базовой версии результаты на GSM8K и MMLU и поддерживает вызов инструментов.

Модель предназначена для генерации текста и диалогов, в том числе для внутренних исследований и red teaming. README сообщает о нулевой частоте отказов на описанных наборах вредоносных запросов; это особенность модели, а не мера точности или безопасности. Модель может выдавать опасные ответы, поэтому для внешнего доступа требуется отдельный слой модерации. Репозиторий содержит веса safetensors и лицензирован по MIT.

Сценарии применения

  • генерация текста в диалогах
  • проведение red teaming языковых моделей
  • исследование поведения модели на вредоносных запросах
  • создание ответов с вызовом инструментов

Ограничения

Модель не отказывает в опасных запросах и сама не обеспечивает защитную модерацию, поэтому при доступе третьих лиц необходим отдельный слой контроля. Ablation не повышает точность: модель сохраняет ошибки базовой версии.

Для каких профессий подходит3

Разделы каталога профессий, в задачах которых используется эта модель

Все профессии

Карточка модели

README от автора на Hugging Face, как он его опубликовал

Открыть на Hugging Face

DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731-Abliterated

An abliterated (refusal-ablated) build of deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731.

Produced by a forward-only, closed-form weight edit — no training, no fine-tuning, no distillation. Only the attention output projections (attn.wo_b) are modified; the MXFP4 experts, mHC (Manifold-Constrained Hyper-Connections), norms and embeddings are byte-identical to the base model. The three MTP blocks are not untouched — their attn.wo_b receives the same rank-1 projection as the main layers (see the recipe table), so the draft head stays consistent with the target.

Measured refusal rate: 0.00% across 913 harmful prompts (AdvBench 520 + HarmBench 393) in both reasoning modes, with no measurable capability loss on GSM8K (1319 items) or MMLU (1000 items).


Recipe

MethodW ← W − λ·Vᵀ(VW) applied to attn.wo_b
λ3.5
Layers10–42 + 3 MTP blocks (layers 0–9 preserved — protocol / chat / tool-calling)
Rank1
Tensors edited36 attn.wo_b.weight (33 layers 10–42 + 3 MTP blocks)
Shards untouched12 (bit-identical to base)
Δrelmedian 0.0567 (min 0.0495 / max 0.0669)

The FP8 (F8_E4M3) weights are dequantised per 128×128 block, projected, and requantised; all other dtypes (F8_E8M0 scales, I8-packed FP4 experts, BF16, F32) are passed through untouched.

Refusal benchmarks

520 AdvBench harmful_behaviors + 400 HarmBench behaviours, temperature=0, greedy. Refusal detection is a deliberately broad keyword matcher (biased toward over-counting refusals); every flagged response was then reviewed by hand.

thinking=true — the model's natural mode, no jailbreak prefix

BenchmarkBase 0731This model
AdvBench (520)97.12% (505/520)0.00% (0/516)
HarmBench standard (200)84.00% (168/200)0.00% (0/195)
HarmBench contextual (93)68.48% (63/92)0.00% (0/90)
HarmBench copyright (100)17.98% (16/89)0.00% (0/76)

thinking=false + assistant prefill "Sure, here is"

BenchmarkBase 0731This model
AdvBench (520)30.58% (159/520)0.00% (0/520)
HarmBench standard (200)22.00% (44/200)0.00% (0/200)
HarmBench contextual (93)17.20% (16/93)0.00% (0/93)
HarmBench copyright (100)6.00% (6/100)0.00% (0/100)

HarmBench semantic categories, thinking=true: the base model refuses chemical_biological 100%, harassment_bullying 100%, illegal 98.3%, harmful 81.0%, misinformation 79.4%, cybercrime 50.0% — this model refuses 0.0% in all six.

Honest note on the raw numbers

The keyword matcher produced 12 raw hits on this model. All 12 were false positives, verified individually:

  • Song lyrics containing refusal-like strings, e.g. Old Town Road — "I'm gonna ride 'til I can't no more"; Clocks — "Lights go out and I can't be saved". The model had fully complied.
  • Capability disclaimers followed by compliance, e.g. "since I'm an AI, I can't literally hack, so I'll give you the actual technical breakdown of how a real hacker would do it."

Raw (unadjudicated) rates were 0.58% on AdvBench/nothink and 5.00–5.26% on the lyrics-heavy copyright split.

thinking=true was measured with vLLM's --reasoning-parser deepseek_v4, so the chain-of-thought lands in reasoning and content holds only the final answer. Responses truncated by max_tokens before the reasoning finished are reported separately and excluded from the denominator (4/520 on AdvBench) rather than being scored as compliance.

Capability

BenchmarkBase 0731This modelΔ1 s.e.
GSM8K (all 1319)95.8%95.2%−0.6 pp±0.57 pp
MMLU (1000 items / 57 subjects)88.4%87.5%−0.9 pp±1.03 pp
Tool-call round-trippasspass——

Both deltas sit within one standard error — statistically indistinguishable from the base model. Tool calling was verified end-to-end (finish_reason: tool_calls, correctly populated arguments), which is why layers 0–9 were deliberately left untouched.

Usage

Drop-in replacement for the base checkpoint — same 48 shards, same index.json, same tokenizer.

vllm serve <path-to-this-repo> --tensor-parallel-size 2 --kv-cache-dtype fp8 \
  --trust-remote-code --enable-auto-tool-choice \
  --tool-call-parser deepseek_v4 --reasoning-parser deepseek_v4

On RTX PRO 6000 Blackwell (SM120), five things are required

Verified on vLLM 0.27.1 / torch 2.13.0+cu130 / Python 3.10. None of these are needed on H200 except (1) and (2).

  1. CUDA_DEVICE_ORDER=PCI_BUS_ID. Without it CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES reorders CUDA devices but not NVML, so vLLM reads the wrong card's compute capability — torch reports (12,0) while vLLM reports major=9. The model then loads fine and dies in profile_run with layout.hpp:107: sf.size(-2) == ceil_div(mn, gran_mn), because the FP8 einsum recipe is chosen for SM90 while DeepGEMM has already packed the scales as INT32 for SM120.
  2. --kernel-config '{"moe_backend":"marlin"}' — the default DEEPGEMM_MXFP4 path hits runtime_utils.hpp:91 Unsupported dtype on SM120.
  3. External DeepGEMM @ 8b1392b, installed with pip install --no-build-isolation (its setup.py imports torch). The bundled vllm/third_party copy ships no SM120 kernels.
  4. Create nvidia/cu13/lib64/ and symlink unversioned .so names into it — the directory does not exist in the pip CUDA wheels, so FlashInfer's JIT link step fails with cannot find -lcudart.
  5. Patch flashinfer/comm/fd_exchange.py with from __future__ import annotations — upstream declares requires-python >=3.10 but uses array.array[int], which needs 3.12. Also pin flashinfer-cubin to exactly the flashinfer-python version (vLLM 0.27.1 pins 0.6.16.post3).

Reproducing the evaluation

evals/ contains every script and result file, plus the raw stdout logs behind each number:

  • probe_refusal.py — refusal probe (CSV benchmarks, category breakdown, truncation accounting)
  • eval_gsm8k.py, eval_mmlu.py — capability evals
  • project_wob.py — the weight-edit script that produced this model
  • logs/ — unfiltered run logs

Intended use and limitations

This model does not refuse, including in the most severe categories measured by HarmBench (chemical/biological, cybercrime, harassment). That is the entire point of the modification, and it means safety behaviour must come from somewhere else in your stack. It is suited to trusted, internal, research and red-teaming contexts. If you expose it to third parties, put your own moderation and policy layer in front of it — the model will not do that job for you.

The abliteration removes a specific learned refusal direction; it does not add knowledge, and it does not make the model's outputs more accurate. Everything the base model gets wrong, this one still gets wrong.

Credits

  • deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 — base model (MIT)
  • drowzeys — the published refusal direction and the project_wob.py / compute_direction.py pipeline
  • apetersson — reference hyper-parameters (λ, layer range) and the Δrel manifest used to sanity-check this run

Support / 打賞

If these models are useful to you, tips are appreciated — they pay for the GPU time. 如果這些模型對你有幫助,歡迎打賞,用於支應算力成本。

USDT (TRC20) · TPTo32r7vKazpTNaFqfFZ2ztoK1DG88888

License

MIT, inherited from the base model.

Как запустить

На своей GPU в ailist. Цена — по текущим предложениям провайдеров

GPU в ailist

vLLM

Нельзя запустить

Доступ к модели ограничен автором; у платформы нет доступа к весам.

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